I haven't said yet whether the coin was to be tossed before or after the Monday awakening. Elga's argument applies in the first instance to the case that it is tossed after; but he thinks, and I agree, that the answer to our question should be the same in both cases. My argument will apply equally to both cases.
Common ground
What gives our disagreement much of its interest is that we agree on so much else (including much that not everyone would agree with). Let me begin by running through the undisputed common ground.
We agree that there are two kinds of possibilities to which credences may be given. There are possibilities about what sort of possible world is actual; and there are possibilities about who one is and when one is and what sort of world one lives in. Following Quine (1969) , we shall represent the latter possibilities as classes of centred worlds: possible worlds with designated individuals-at-times within them. Call the classes of centred worlds centred possibilities. (We could represent the former possibilities, the uncentred possibilities, as classes of uncentred possible worlds; but we needn't bother, since we can subsume the uncentred possibilities under the centred ones.) It may happen that two centred worlds are situated within the same uncentred possible world: only their designated individuals-at-times differ. If so, I call them collocated.
When Beauty awakens during the experiment, three centred epistemic possibilities are compatible with her total evidence: H 1 : HEADS and it's Monday, T 1 : TAILS and it's Monday, T 2 : TAILS and it's Tuesday. Elga writes, 'Since being in T 1 is subjectively just like being in T 2 , and since exactly the same propositions are true whether you are in T 1 or T 2 , even a highly restricted principle of indifference yields that you ought then to have equal credence in each' (144). By 'proposition' he means an uncentred possibility. The reason the same propositions are true whether Beauty is in T 1 or T 2 is that the centred worlds that are members of T 1 are collocated with the corresponding members of T 2 .
I accept Elga's 'highly restricted principle of indifference'. 1 So we have a further point of agreement:
(1) P(T 1 ) = P(T 2 ).
When, part-way through her Monday awakening, Beauty is told that it's Monday, her credence function changes from P to P + . Elga and I agree that this change takes place by conditioning on her new evidence, which can be expressed as not-T 2 , or as (H 1 ⁄ T 1 ). So
Her total evidence at the start of her Monday awakening tells her that HEADS is true iff H 1 is true of her at that time; and likewise for TAILS and (T 1 ⁄ T 2 ). It is routine to restate a conditional credence as a quotient of unconditional credences. So we agree that
and further that
We further agree that
Beauty gains no new uncentred evidence, relevant to HEADS versus TAILS, between the time when she has credence function P -and the time when she has credence function P. The only evidence she gains is the centred evidence 2 that she is presently undergoing either the Monday awakening or the Tuesday awakening: that is, (H 1 ⁄ T 1 ⁄ T 2 ).
Here agreement ends. Now I shall look at our respective analyses of the problem, including our different conclusions about P(HEADS).
Elga's argument
Elga, considering only the case that the coin toss comes after the Monday awakening, argues from later to earlier.
instead of being told that the coin is fair, Beauty is instead told that it is biased 999 to 1 in favour of heads!(E4) \ P(H 1 ) = P(T 1 ) = P(T 2 ) = 1/3 (E3, 1). (E5) \ P(HEADS) = 1/3, P(TAILS) = 2/3 (E4, 4).
Quod erat demonstrandum; but we note two further consequences.
(E6) \ P + (HEADS) = P(HEADS) + 1/6 (E1, E5). (E7) \ A change in credence from P -to P was not produced by new relevant uncentred evidence; either it was not produced by relevant evidence at all, or else the centred evidence (H 1 ⁄ T 1 ⁄ T 2 ) was relevant to HEADS versus TAILS (E5, 5, 6).
My argument
I, considering both cases, argue from earlier to later.
(L1) Only new relevant evidence, centred or uncentred, produces a change in credence; and the evidence (H 1 ⁄ H 2 ⁄ H 3 ) is not relevant to HEADS versus TAILS (Premiss). (L2) \ P(HEADS) = 1/2 = P(TAILS) (L1, 5, 6).
Quod erat demonstrandum; but we note five further consequences.
(L3) \ P(H 1 ) = 1/2 = P(T 1 ) + P(T 2 ) (L2, 4). (L4) \ P(T 1 ) = 1/4 = P(T 2 ) (L3, 1). (L5) \ P(HEADS | H 1 ⁄ T 1 ) = 2/3, P(TAILS | H 1 ⁄ T 1 ) = 1/3 (L3, L4, 3). (L6) \ P + (HEADS) = 2/3, P + (TAILS) = 1/3 (L5, 2). (L7) \ P + (HEADS) = P(HEADS) + 1/6 (L2, L6).
The shape of the disagreement

Elga rejects my premiss: his (E7) contradicts my (L1). I reject Elga's premiss: my (L6) contradicts his (E1).
That's the entire source of our disagreement. We must reject one premiss or the other. Given both (and the agreed-upon common ground) we end up with an antinomy. What more can be said? Elga's reason for rejecting my premiss is that he is following where argument leads. He regards it as a surprising discovery that '[a change in credence] can happen to a perfectly rational agent during a period in which that agent neither receives new information' -that is, no new uncentred evidence -'nor suffers a cognitive mishap' (146). In my view it would be equally surprising, and equally suspect, to discover that the centred evidence (H 1 ⁄ T 1 ⁄ T 2 ) was relevant to HEADS versus TAILS; or to discover that Beauty had suffered a cognitive mishap. (Memory erasure is indeed a cognitive mishap; but that happens later, so it is irrelevant to the change at issue between P -and P.) Fair enough; but it would be nicer if one's rejection of the other's premiss were independently motivated.
I, on the other hand, claim that my reason for rejecting Elga's premiss is independently motivated. Where did Elga get it? At the time of P + , in the case Elga is considering in which the coin toss happens after that time, Beauty knows that there will be a future toss of a fair coin. There is a well-known principle which says that credences about future chance events should equal the known chances. (See Mellor 1971; Lewis 1980 .) It is just this principle that gave us the agreed-upon (5), applying both to the case that the coin toss will happen before the Monday awakening and to the case that it will happen after. The same principle would seem to say also that P + (HEADS) = chance(HEADS) = 1/2 and that P + (TAILS) = chance(TAILS) = 1/2, thereby providing Elga's premiss (E1).
I reply that the principle requires a proviso, which was satisfied when we used it to give us (5), but which is not satisfied when Elga uses it to give him his premiss (E1). Imagine that there is a prophet whose extraordinary record of success forces us to take seriously the hypothesis that he is getting news from the future by means of some sort of backward causation. Seldom does the prophet tell us outright what will happen, but often he advises us what our credences about the outcome should be, and sometimes his advice disagrees with what we would get by setting our credences equal to the known chances. What should we do? If the prophet's success record is good enough, I say we should take the prophet's advice and disregard the known chances. Now when Beauty is told during her Monday awakening that it's Monday, or equivalently not-T 2 , she is getting evidence -centred evidence -about the future: namely that she is not now in it. That's new evidence: before she was told that it was Monday, she did not yet have it. To be sure, she is not getting this new evidence from a prophet or by way of backward causation, but neither is she getting it just by setting her credences equal to the known chances. The news is relevant to HEADS, since it raises her credence in it by 1/6; see my (L7). Elga agrees; see his (E6). Therefore the proviso applies, and we cannot rely on it that P + (HEADS) = chance(HEADS) and P + (TAILS) = chance(TAILS). I admit that this is a novel and surprising application of the proviso, and I am most grateful to Elga for bringing it to my attention. Nevertheless I find it fairly convincing, independently of wishing to follow where my argument leads.
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